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Abstract 
This paper examined the links between selective attention, memory bias, interpretive 
bias, and anxiety problems in a community sample of 81 children (38 females) aged 9-17 years. 
Cognitive biases were assessed using a word and picture Dot Probe Discrimination task to assess 
selective attention, a memory task to assess a memory bias, and the CNCEQ to assess 
interpretive bias. Childhood anxiety was assessed using the parent and child versions of the 
RCMAS and RCADS. Significant associations were found between the three cognitive biases 
and childhood anxiety problems. In addition, selective attention was found to be associated with 
the selective abstraction subscale of the CNCEQ. The results did not support the mediation of 
selective attention and interpretive bias by memory bias. Finally, the results supported a 
cognitive model that posited that interpretive bias may be predictive of childhood anxiety 
problems beyond what is predicted by selective attention and memory bias. 
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Introduction 
Anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent emotional disorders in childhood with 
prevalence rates ranging from 2.4-18% in community samples (Albano, Chorpita, & Barlow, 
1996; Anderson, 1994; Anderson, Williams, McGee, & Silva, 1987; Kashani & Orvaschel, 1988; 
1990; Labellarte, Ginsburg, Walkup, & Riddle, 1999). Although anxiety in childhood and 
adolescence is often considered transient, a large number of children and adolescents contend 
with chronic anxiety problems (Keller, Lavori, Wunder, Beardslee, & Schwartz, 1992; Last, 
Perrin, Hersen, & Kazdin, 1996; Messer & Beidel, 1994; Ollendick & King, 1994; Orvaschel, 
Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1995). Additionally, anxiety disorders are related to several negative 
outcomes. For example, anxiety disorders are associated with poor academic and social 
functioning in youth (Bernstein, & Borchardt, 1991; Bernstein, Borchardt, & Perwien, 1996; 
Silverman & Ginsburg, 1998). There is also evidence suggesting that children with anxiety 
disorders are at an increased likelihood of comorbid disorders in childhood as well as an 
increased risk for psychopathology in adulthood (Last et al., 1996; Orvaschel et al., 1995; Pine, 
Cohen, Gurley, Brook, & Ma, 1998). Lastly, longitudinal studies have suggested that childhood 
anxiety disorders have lasting effects on the functioning of individuals into adulthood (Buitelaar, 
Ban Andel, Duyx, van Strien, 1994; Hagopian & Ollendick, 1997; Keller et al., 1992; Ollendick, 
Lease, & Cooper, 1993; Woodward & Furgusson, 2001). Due to the widespread nature of 
anxiety disorders in childhood and the negative impact they can have on the lives of children and 
adolescents, it is important to understand the processes through which anxiety disorders develop 
and are maintained. 
There have been a number of studies suggesting that cognitive and information 
processing biases play an important role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders in 
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adults (e.g., Mathews, & MacLeod, 1994; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Similarly, anxiety and 
anxiety disorders in children are thought to be associated with differences in the way children 
process information. These differences in cognitive processing have been termed “cognitive 
biases”. Selective attention has emerged as a potentially important specific cognitive bias in 
childhood anxiety (see Vasey & Daleiden, 1996). Selective attention involves focusing attention 
toward a category of stimuli (e.g., threatening stimuli) when such stimuli are placed in a context 
with other categories of stimuli (e.g., neutral or other non-threatening stimuli). However, it is not 
clear what role selective attention plays in childhood anxiety problems. For example, selective 
attention may be merely associated with anxiety problems in children or may work in concert 
with other cognitive biases to predict anxiety problems in children. Additional research is needed 
to better understand the manner in which selective attention is associated with anxiety. In 
particular, further research is needed to explore the linkages between selective attention and 
other cognitive biases, such as, memory biases (i.e., a bias towards the recall of threatening 
information), and interpretive biases (i.e., having disproportionately negative interpretations of 
neutral or ambiguous stimuli) to better understand the link between anxiety and the way children 
process information. In the following sections, the existing literature on selective attention and 
memory and interpretive biases is reviewed.  
Selective Attention and Childhood Anxiety 
It has been suggested that emotional stimuli can attract attention over non-emotional 
stimuli. As noted, several theorists have suggested that selective attention towards threatening 
stimuli may play a large role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety symptoms and disorders 
in both children and adults (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Mathews, 1990; Weems & Watts, 2005; 
Williams et al., 1988). For example, Mathews (1990) theorized that one of the fundamental 
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characteristics of anxiety was the scanning of an individual’s surroundings with a predisposition 
for attending to and processing potentially threatening stimuli, suggesting that those who are 
vulnerable to high levels of anxiety have such a tendency.  
The majority of research on the relation between childhood anxiety problems and 
selective attention has examined this tendency utilizing one of two methods. The first procedure, 
a modification of the Stoop Color-Naming task (Stroop, 1935) has been used widely in research 
but has yielded inconsistent results (e.g., Kindt, Bierman, & Brosschot, 1997; Kindt & 
Brosschot, 1999; Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999; Moradi, Neshat-
Doost, Taghavi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999; Taghavi, Dalgleish, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 
2003). The modified Stroop Color-Naming task measures attention through the presentation of 
words (e.g., house, gate, or throw) in various colors (e.g., red, yellow, green, or blue), asking the 
participant to name the color of each word, and calculating the latency in naming the color. The 
theory behind the task is that the longer it takes for a person to name the color the more they are 
attending to the word. Therefore, longer latencies for threat-related words as opposed to neutral 
words indicate a bias towards threat related words over neutral words.  
Taghavi et al. (2003) found evidence supporting a relation between attention biases and 
anxiety using a modified Stroop task in a sample of 19 children (9 girls and 10 boys; mean age of 
13.47 years) with GAD (diagnosis was determined by a team of mental health professionals; 
with no co-morbid diagnosis of MDD) and a control group of 19 children (11 girls and 8 boys; 
mean age of 14.50 years) with no diagnosis. The results indicated the GAD group had longer 
latencies for threat-related information than did the control group. However, Kindt et al. (1997) 
found no differences in attention bias towards threat information in a group of high anxious vs. 
low anxious children. Similarly, Dalgleish et al. (2003) found no evidence supporting an 
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attention bias related to depression, GAD, or PTSD utilizing a modified Stroop task. Given the 
inconsistent findings using the modified Stroop task, the validity of the task as a measure of 
selective attention is questionable (e.g., Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1983; MacLeod & Mathews, 
1991; see Vasey & MacLeod, 2001).  
As a more sophisticated method of measuring of selective attention, MacLeod, Matthews, 
and Tata (1986) developed the Dot Probe Detection task. The Dot Probe Detection task has 
yielded more consistent results in assessing selective attention in children (see Vasey et al., 
1996) but was developed only recently and has been utilized less often in research (e.g., Vasey, 
El-Hag, & Daleiden, 1996 and Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Taghavi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000). The 
task involves the simultaneous presentation of, for example, two words (or other threat-related 
stimuli) on a screen (e.g., one at the top of the screen and one at the bottom). Immediately 
following the removal of the words from the screen, a probe (e.g. dot) is presented in the same 
location as one of the preceding words (e.g., in the top space where the word had just appeared). 
The participant is asked to indicate the presence of the probe by pressing a button (e.g. spacebar). 
The length of time it takes for the participant to correctly identify the presence of the probe is 
measured. The theory behind this assessment technique is that the faster the probe is detected the 
more likely it was that the participant was attending to the stimulus that was located in the same 
position preceding the appearance of the probe. Therefore, shorter probe detection latencies for 
one category of stimuli (e.g. threat) over another should indicate a selective attention bias 
towards the category with the shorter probe detection latency.  
A number of studies have found a link between childhood anxiety problems and selective 
attention utilizing the Dot Probe Detection task (Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, 
Canterbury, & Yule; 2003; Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & Brown, 1995; Vasey et al. 1996). For 
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example, Vasey et al. (1995) used the Dot Probe Detection task to examine biased attention in 
childhood anxiety disorders with a sample of children, aged 9 to 17, meeting diagnostic criteria 
for an anxiety disorders (n=12) and control subjects matched on age, gender, and intellectual 
ability who did not meet diagnostic criteria for any psychological disorder (n=12). Results 
indicated that children with anxiety disorders demonstrated biased attention directed toward 
threatening stimuli (i.e., threat words).  
Vasey et al. (1996) also examined the relation between anxiety and attention biases in a 
sample of 40 6th and 8th graders. Participants were assigned to one of two groups [high test-
anxious (10 boys and 10 girls) and low test-anxious (10 boys and 10 girls)] based on their scores 
on the Test Anxiety Scale for children (Sarason, Davidson, Lighthall, Waite, & Ruebush, 1960). 
The cutoff scores for girls were below 10 for the low-test-anxious group and above 16 or higher 
for the low-test-anxious group; the cutoff scores for boys were 7 or lower for the low-test-
anxious group and 12 or higher for the high-test-anxious group. Results indicated that there was 
an attention bias for threatening information in high-test-anxious children as well as an attention 
bias away from threatening information in low-test-anxious boys (the girls in the study did not 
display this bias). These findings provide further support for a link between childhood anxiety 
and selective attention. 
As part of a study discussed earlier investigating the relation of cognitive biases (e.g. 
memory and selective attention) and various disorders [e.g. Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), 
GAD, and PTSD], Dalgleish et al. (2003) examined the association between different categories 
of the emotional valence of information and attention biases in relation to Depression, GAD, and 
PTSD using a Dot Probe Detection task that employed 48 negative words matched in length and 
frequency with 48 neutral words to create 48 “critical” word pairs. Each participant, based on a 
 6
clinical interview, was assigned to one of four diagnostic categories: 1) the depressed group (n = 
19; 10 girls and 9 boys; met DSM-IV criteria for a primary diagnosis of MDD); 2) the PTSD 
group (n = 24; 12 girls and 12 boys; met DSM-IV criteria for a primary diagnosis of PTSD with 
no co-morbid MDD diagnosis); 3) the GAD group (n = 24; 11 girls and 13 boys; met DSM-IV 
criteria for a primary diagnosis of GAD with no co-morbid diagnosis of MDD); and 4) control 
group (n = 26; 16 girls and 10 boys; did not meet DSM-IV criteria for the diagnosis of any 
disorder nor had any history of psychiatric disorder). Results indicated a different pattern of 
processing across the different disorders. Specifically, the results indicated an attention bias 
towards threat-related words in only the GAD group; the PTSD and MDD groups did not show 
an attention bias towards threat-related information. 
Thus far, research exploring the link between selective attention and childhood anxiety 
has focused on comparing groups in the extremes of psychopathology (i.e., those with diagnosed 
disorders compared to groups with no history of psychiatric diagnosis). For example, Vasey et al. 
(1995) examined biased attention in childhood anxiety disorders with a sample of children 
meeting diagnostic criteria for anxiety disorders and control subjects. The extant research has not 
examined whether a linear relationship exists between selective attention and childhood anxiety 
problems or if these differences only exist in the extremes of psychopathology. Similarly, there 
has been little research on the linkages between selective attention and other forms of cognitive 
biases such as, memory and interpretive biases. Consequently, further research is needed to 
better understand the nature of the relation between selective attention and anxiety levels in 
children as well as the relations between selective attention, memory bias, and interpretive bias.  
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Memory Biases and Interpretive Biases  
In addition to selective attention, several cognitive theorists have suggested that a bias 
towards the recall of threatening information, or a memory bias, is also associated with anxiety 
(e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Weems & Watts, 2005). Empirical evidence supporting a link 
between memory bias and childhood anxiety problems has been found. For example, Daleiden 
(1998) found support for an association between anxiety, memory bias, and stimuli valence in a 
sample of 80 6th - 8th graders. The results of this study suggest that high anxious children are 
biased towards the recall of negative information over neutral information. In addition, research 
has found an association between memory bias and PTSD in children aged 9-17 years (Moradi, 
Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish; 2000). Moradi et al. (2000) compared a group of 
children who met DSM-IV criteria for PTSD (n = 24) and a group with those with no history of 
trauma or psychiatric diagnosis (n = 25). The results indicated no difference between the groups 
on the amount of negative information recalled but the PTSD group recalled less positive 
information. These results of these studies suggest the presence of a link between childhood 
anxiety problems and memory biases.  
Although little research has been conducted on the linkages between memory biases and 
childhood anxiety problems, one of the ways that emotional memory biases have been assessed 
in relation to anxiety problems in children is through the recall of a list of words with different 
levels of emotional valence. For example, Moradi et al. (2000) conducted a study in which 
participants were asked to recall words from a list of 36 negative words (12 depression-related; 
12 threat-related; 12 trauma-related), 12 positive words, and 12 neutral words presented 
individually on a computer screen. After a minute and a half, the children were asked to write 
down all the words that they remembered for five minutes. Immediately following this free recall 
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task, the children were asked to indicate which words had been previously presented from a list 
of 120 words (60 from the original list and 60 filler words matched in length, readability, and 
emotional content). This method was designed to assess the recall of negative words in relation 
to positive and neutral words and allow for a measure of assessing memory in terms of a bias 
towards emotional words. 
Biases in interpretation, which involve having a disproportionate amount of emotionally 
valenced (e.g. threatening) interpretations of neutral, ambiguous, or potentially threatening 
stimuli or situations in relation to other categories of interpretations (e.g. non-threatening) are 
thought to be a core factors in anxious and depressive disorders (Beck, 1976, 1985; Ellis, 1962). 
In recent years, several studies have suggested that anxious children may display biases for 
negative interpretation of stimuli. Hadwin, Frost, French and Richards (1997), using a pictorial-
homophone task with children (aged 7-9 years), found that trait anxiety scores were positively 
correlated with the number of threatening interpretations chosen. Similarly, research has shown 
that a similar types of biases in clinically anxious children when asked to interpret the content of 
ambiguous vignettes (Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1996).  
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery (1979) described a number of ways that information can be 
negatively biased during interpretation. Four types of interpretive biases, or negative cognitive 
errors, include catastrophizing (i.e., expecting the worst possible outcome of an event or 
situation, such as “I got a bad grade on my homework, therefore I will fail the class.”), 
overgeneralizing (i.e., believing that a single negative outcome is representative of or will occur 
in all similar future events, such as “my team lost this game; we will probably lose the next one 
too.”), personalizing (i.e., attributing control over the outcome of negative events to internal 
causes, such as “my mother lost her job because of me.”) and selective abstraction (i.e., focusing 
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on only the negative aspects of an event, such as “I did awful on my history test. I may have 
made an A, but I missed an easy question.”).  
One of the best-validated measures for assessing general interpretive biases is the 
Leitenberg, Leonard, and Carroll-Wilson (1986) Children’s Negative Cognitive Error 
Questionnaire (CNCEQ). The measure assesses each of the four types of cognitive biases. 
Weems, Berman, Silverman, and Saavedra (2001) examined the association between negative 
cognitive errors assessed with the CNCEQ and anxiety symptoms as well as anxiety sensitivity 
assessed with the CASI in a sample of children and adolescents who were clinic referred for 
anxiety disorders (N = 251, ages 6 to16 years). Results indicated that each of the types of errors, 
except selective abstraction, were significantly positively related to self-reported anxiety [e.g., 
the trait version of the State Trait Anxiety Index for Children (STAIC; Spielberger, 1973) and 
the Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale, (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978)] and 
anxiety sensitivity even when controlling for levels of depression (correlations ranged from .39 
to .43). 
Integrative Summary 
Collectively, the research suggests that childhood anxiety problems may be related to a 
variety of cognitive biases including attention, memory bias, and interpretive bias. Memory and 
interpretive biases may be influenced by the limitation selective attention places on the type of 
information obtained from the environment (Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewaka, & Boss, 1989). Such a 
view suggests that threat-related selective attention, memory bias, and interpretive bias are not 
only individually related to anxiety, but also linked to one another. It has been proposed, that 
selective attention towards threatening stimuli may foster a bias towards the recall of threatening 
information. This memory bias may, in turn, foster the threatening interpretation of ambiguous 
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stimuli (Weems & Watts, 2005). Theses biases may work together to predict childhood anxiety 
symptoms. Specifically, selective attention, memory bias, and interpretive bias may each 
incrementally predict childhood anxiety problems. Although there is evidence to indicate that 
childhood anxiety problems are related to selective attention, memory bias, and interpretive bias, 
the associations among these biases in youths and their combined associations with anxiety has 
yet to be examined. 
As noted, very little research has been conducted examining how the various biases are 
related to each other. However, Dalgleish et al. (2003), in a study discussed above, did measure 
both attention and memory bias in a sample of children. Using the same words from Stroop 
Color-Naming task, Dalgleish et al. (2003) assessed memory bias by asking children to recall the 
words that are presented to them in the Stroop Color-Naming task. The words were divided into 
four groups based on emotional valence. Of the 60 words, 24 were threat-related (related to 
threat and trauma situations), 12 were depression-related words, 12 were happy words and 12 
were neutral words. The participants were presented each word individually on a computer 
screen and asked to repeat each word three times. After the completion of the word presentation, 
the children were asked to count for 1.5 minutes and then asked to write down all the words they 
remembered from the list for five minutes. The results indicated no difference between groups on 
the types of words recalled and the association between memory biases and selective attention 
was not presented. This failure to find a memory bias may be due, in part, to the use of the words 
from the Stroop Color-Naming task and the structure of the memory task. The memory task 
utilized in this study required the participants to allocate attention equally towards both threat 
and neutral words by reading each word aloud three times. Weems and Watts (2005) theorized 
that cognitive biases, such memory biases, may be highly influenced by the process of 
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selectively attending to one category of information over another. The structure of the memory 
task may not have allowed for the influences of selective attention on memory bias; therefore, 
the methodology of the memory task may have resulted in a failure to detect a memory bias 
associated with childhood anxiety problems.  
The use of the words from the Dot Probe Detection task may have been more appropriate 
for this task because of the structure of the Dot Probe Detection task. The Dot Probe Detection 
task positions two words with varying emotional valence (e.g., a threat and a neutral word) 
simultaneously on the screen and, in the case of selective attention, the participants will focus on 
one word (e.g., threat word) over another (e.g., neutral word). The positioning of the two words 
on the same screen at the same time may create completion for attention. This competition for 
attention may allow for the selective encoding into memory of one word over another. Therefore, 
the structure of the Dot Probe Detection task may be a more effective in assessing a memory bias 
towards the recall of emotional words.    
Another limiting factor for the examination of selective attention has been the almost 
exclusive use of single-word stimuli. The validity of single word based Dot Probe Detection 
tasks utilized in the majority of research on selective attention in children with anxiety problems 
has been called into question (see Vasey et al., 2003). Although some developmental differences 
have been taken into account (e.g., longer presentation times on the Dot Probe Detection task; 
Vasey et al., 1995), it is unclear whether these allowances for age related differences in reading 
ability effect the processes of selective attention. Specifically, does allowing children more time 
to process the stimuli confound the results of the experiment? Furthermore, another limiting 
factor to the Dot Probe Detection task is a child’s the susceptibility to fatigue. This Detection 
task utilizes a large number of word pairs (e.g., 196 word pairs; Dalgleish et al., 2003; Moradi et 
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al., 2000). There are a number of suggested alterations made to the original Dot Probe Detection 
task to accommodate a child’s susceptibility to fatigue. For example, frequent and longer rest 
intervals (see Vasey et. al., 2003). Another way to limit the effects of fatigue is to modify the 
task to lessen the number of trials involved in the task. This can be accomplished through the use 
of a Dot Probe Discrimination task. The Discrimination task uses fewer stimulus trials (e.g., 32 
word pairs). The Detection task necessitates fewer stimulus trials because each of the trails is 
probed. In the Detection task the trails more trials are necessary because only a specific number 
of trials are probed (e.g., 48 out of 196 word pairs; Dalgleish et al., 2003; Moradi et al., 2000). 
By using fewer trials, the child may be less likely to become fatigued during the task.  
In addition, developmental differences in the content of children’s worries across 
childhood may also affect the results of single-word based Dot Probe Detection tasks. Older 
children (aged 6 to 11 years) have been found to worry more about performance and appearance 
than do younger children (aged 12 to 16 years; Weems et al., 2000). The use of threat words that 
are related to social situations may be less salient for younger children than for older children 
and therefore would fail to indicate the presence of an attention bias in younger children. 
Pictorial stimuli of angry faces have been used to examine whether there is an association 
between anxiety problems in adults and selective attention. For example, Bradley, Mogg, and 
Millar (2000) found that trait anxiety in adults was related to an attention bias towards threat 
faces. Further research is needed to explore whether there is a similar bias among children with 
anxiety problems. In general, research is needed to explore the ability to establish whether or not 
selective attention is present in young children. Being able to establish the existence of such a 
bias in younger children will help to investigate the possible role of selective attention in the 
development of anxiety problems in youth.  
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The Proposed Study 
The purpose of this study is to add empirical support for theories posed by researchers 
such as Vasey et al. (1996) and Weems and Watts (2005). Specifically, this study attempts to 
replicate and extend the findings that selective attention towards threatening stimuli is associated 
with anxiety in youth by examining its association in a community sample and testing the linear 
association between selective attention and anxiety levels. It is important to study this in 
community samples because it allows for an examination into whether these associations exist in 
only the extremes of psychopathology or whether there is an association in various levels of 
symptomology. Additionally, this study will examine the interrelations among selective 
attention, memory bias, and interpretive bias and test their combined prediction of anxiety.  
Hypotheses of the Proposed Investigation 
1. Children with high levels of anxiety will differ from children with low levels of anxiety on 
levels of attention bias towards threatening stimuli. Specifically, children with high levels of 
anxiety will show a greater bias (i.e., longer detection latencies) in attending towards threat 
stimuli than children with low levels of anxiety.  
2. Attention, memory, and interpretative biases will each be associated linearly with each other 
and with levels of childhood anxiety problems (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized Model of Selective Attention, Memory Bias, and Interpretive Bias 
Predicting Childhood Anxiety.  
 
 
3. Memory bias towards the recall of threatening information will mediate the association 
between selective attention towards threatening stimuli and interpretative bias (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Hypothesized Model for the Mediation of Selective Attention and Interpretive Bias by 
Memory Bias.  
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4. In the event that memory biases were not found to be a mediator between selective attention 
and interpretive biases and if all three cognitive biases are found to be individually and 
significantly related to childhood anxiety problems, an alternative test of how the three 
cognitive biases may be related to anxiety was tested. From the model depicted in Figure 3  
 (Weems and Watts, 2005), interpretive bias may be more directly related to the process of 
childhood anxiety problems than selective attention or memory bias (i.e., interpretative biases 
are more potentially proximally related to anxiety in the model). This would suggest that 
interpretive bias will predict childhood anxiety problems beyond what is predicted by 
selective attention to threatening stimuli and memory bias towards the recall of threatening 
information. 
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Figure 3. A Schematic Model of Hypothetical Relations among the Cognitive Biases and their 
Role in the Exacerbation of Anxiety 
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Method 
Participants 
Data were collected from 81 participants (38 females and 43 males) and their primary 
care givers (mothers 87.7%, fathers 7.4%, and grandparents 4.9%). The participants, aged 9 to 17 
years (mean age = 12.83, SD = 2.5), were Caucasian (56.8%), African-American (33.3%), 
Hispanic (4.9%), Asian (2.5%), and other ethnic backgrounds (2.5%). The median family income 
was between $40,000 and $50,000. 
Participants were recruited through written advertisements posted on college campuses. 
Adult students enrolled in courses at the University of New Orleans were recruited through sign-
up sheets with details regarding the study and financial incentive to participate. In addition, the 
participants were recruited through local area elementary, middle, and high schools. With the 
school’s permission, a letter was sent home with the children addressed to the parent. 
Assessments were conducted between 9am and 6pm, Mondays through Saturdays to 
accommodate for school and work schedules. Participants received a small monetary reward as 
compensation for participating in the research study.  
Children were excluded if parents indicated that the child had a history of one or more of 
the following diagnoses--all pervasive developmental disorders, mental retardation, selective 
mutism, organic mental disorders, schizophrenia, and other psychotic disorders, or were are at 
risk for harm to self or others.  
Measures 
Demographics. Demographic information was collected from each parent including age, 
gender, race, child’s education level, parental marital status, and family income.  
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The following section describes two groups of measures that were used in this study: 1) 
the first group was used to assess anxiety levels, 2) the second group of measures were used to 
assess the various cognitive mechanisms.  
1. Measures of Anxiety  
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978) 
was used to assess anxiety. The 37-item measure is designed to assess general anxiety in 
children. It generates four sub-scales (Worry-Oversensitivity, Physiological, Concentration, and 
social desirability or “lie” sub-scale) and has been widely used in researching childhood anxiety. 
The RCMAS has an adequate internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and construct validity 
(e.g., Reynolds & Richmond, 1978). Parents also completed the parent version of the RCMAS. 
The RCMAS-P asks parents to rate their child’s anxiety with similar items as the RCMAS (i.e., 
wording is changed from “I” to “My child”) and twenty-eight items are summed from ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ responses to yield a Total Anxiety score. Each item is scored with a zero or one. The 
RCMAS-P has similar validity estimates to the RCMAS (Pina, Silverman, Saavedra, & Weems, 
2001). Internal consistency (coefficient alpha) for the RCMAS total anxiety scores for both the 
parent and child versions were computed in this study’s sample. Internal consistencies for the 
parent and child versions were .83 and .85, respectively, in the full sample. In youth aged 9 to 12 
years the internal consistencies for the parent and child versions were .82 and .81, respectively 
and for youth aged 13 to 17 years internal consistencies for the parent and child versions were 
.83 and .87, respectively.  
The Revised Child Anxiety and Depression scales (RCADS; Chorpita, Yim, Moffitt, 
Umemoto, and Francis, 2000; Spence, 1997). The RCADS is a 47-item adaptation of the Spence 
Children’s Anxiety Scale that assesses symptoms of each anxiety disorder (except PTSD) and 
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depression based on DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994). The scale is scored 1 “Never”, 2 
“Sometimes”, 3 “Often”, 4 “Always” and contains a total anxiety score (i.e., the sum of all 
anxiety symptoms) as well as scales for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), panic disorder and 
agoraphobia (PDA), separation anxiety disorder (SAD), social anxiety disorder (SOC), obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) and specific phobia (SP). The RCADS is an adaptation of the 
Spence Anxiety Scales (Spence, 1997). Moreover, the RCADS demonstrated concurrent validity 
with existing measures of childhood anxiety and anxiety disorders (Chorpita et al., 2000). In 
addition, Parents also completed a parent version of the RCADS (RCADS-P) designed identical 
to the RCADS with modification similar to those of the RCMAS-P (i.e., wording was changed 
from “I” to “My child”). Internal consistency (coefficient alpha) for the RCADS total anxiety 
scores for both the parent and child versions were computed in this study’s sample. Internal 
consistencies for the parent and child versions were .93 and .94, respectively, in the full sample. 
In youth aged 9 to 12 years the internal consistencies for the parent and child versions were .92 
and .93, respectively and for youth aged 13 to 17 years internal consistencies for the parent and 
child versions were both .94.  
A Composite Anxiety score was formed by computing the unit-weighted scores. Z-scores 
from the averaged sum of individual items measuring a construct (i.e., the RCMAS parent and 
child versions and the RCADS parent and child versions) were combined to create the 
Composite Anxiety score. Unit-weighted scores have been found to be preferable to 
differentially weighted scores. Due to the aggregation of multiple items, unit-weighted factors 
provide a high degree of reliability. Unit-weighted factors have been shown to correlate .95 with 
differentially-weighted factors, but show lower standard errors and increased stability of 
estimates across studies and samples than differentially-weighted factors (see Dawes, 1971; 
 20
Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Kaiser, 1970; Wainer, 1976). Unit-weighted factors are desirable for 
use in this study because it allows for the integration of multiple sources (e.g., parent and child) 
and multiple measures (e.g., RCMAS & RCADS). This integration into one composite score 
reduces the probability of Type 1 error by reducing the number of statistical tests needed to test 
the main hypotheses. The composite anxiety score has as its indicators: 1) the deviation score of 
parent-rated anxiety items from the RCMAS & RCADS and 2) the deviation score of youth-rated 
anxiety items on the RCMAS and RCADS. 
Parent and child reports often demonstrate low correlations between the two reporters 
(Achenbach, McConaughy, & Howell; 1987, Weems, Silverman, Saavedra, Pina, & Lumpkin, 
1999). Because, the Composite Anxiety score gives equal weight to both parent and child report, 
a RCADS High score was also computed using the RCADS parent and child versions of the 
RCADS. The score was computed by comparing the rating of the parent and child and selecting 
the highest score from each for use in the analyses. The method of utilizing the highest rating 
between two reporters has been recommended for use in integrating multiple source information 
in the reporting of anxiety disorders (Reich & Earls, 1987).   
2. Cognitive Mechanisms 
Attention. Two modified versions of the Dot Probe Detection task (MacLeod Matthews 
& Tata, 1986) were used for this study. The two variants are Dot Probe Discrimination tasks. 
The fundamental difference between the Detection and Discrimination task is the manner in 
which the trials are probed. The underlying methodologies of the two tasks are similar. A 
fixation point was presented in the center of a computer screen, followed by the simultaneous 
presentation of two stimuli, one on the top half of the screen, one on the bottom. The stimuli 
were equal distances from the center of the screen. For the Detection task, only a specific number 
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of trials (e.g., 48 out of 196 trials) are followed by a probe (e.g., an ‘X’). Each participant is 
asked to strike a key (e.g. spacebar) when a trial is followed by a probe. Following the 
presentation of the two stimuli for the Discrimination task, a probe appeared in the place of 
either the top or the bottom stimulus. The participant was asked to strike the up arrow key if the 
probe appeared in place of the top stimulus and the down arrow key if the probe appeared in pace 
of the bottom stimulus.  
For both tasks, the time between the appearance of the probe and the key strike, or the 
probe detection latency, was recorded. Versions of the Dot Probe Detection task have been used 
widely in research for both children and adults (see Vasey et al, 1996). The two variants of the 
Dot Probe Detection task utilized in this study were presented using a Latitude C800 Pentium III 
Processor 850MHz with a 15 inch SXGA plus Display. The programs for the tasks were 
designed and implemented using E-Prime Version 1.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 
2001). Using E-prime, probe detection latencies were measured to 1msec. accuracy.  
Word Dot Probe Discrimination task. The task consisted of a list of 32 threat-neutral 
word pairs (see Table 1) utilized in a previous study (Neshat-Doost et al., 2000) with children 
ages 9-17. The threat and neutral words were generated by a group of 221 children in 6 primary 
and secondary schools in London (Neshat-Doost, et al., 1999). The 32 threat words were 
matched on both length and frequency with 32 neutral words. Participants were asked to read 
aloud the fixation point, which was either the number ‘1’ or ‘2’, instead of the upper word. The 
fixation  point appeared for 1000msec and be followed by the presentation of a word pair for 
1,500msec, the presentation time used in previous research for children as young as age 9 (e.g., 
Vasey, 1995), to allow adequate time for the words to be read. The 32 threat-neutral word pairs 
were followed by a probe, the letter ‘X’. The probe appeared in the same location as one of the 
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words. Each child was asked to strike the up-arrow or down-arrow key to indicate the location of 
the probe (top or bottom, respectively). The probe remained on the screen until the participant 
struck the either arrow key and the probe detection latency was recorded. If no key was struck, 
then the probe remained on the screen for 5 seconds. Half of the threat-neutral word pairs were 
presented with the threat word in the top location the other half were presented with the threat 
word in the bottom location. The probe that follows was alternated so that 50% of the probes 
appeared in the bottom location and 50% appeared in the top. In all, the set of 16 threat-neutral 
word pairs with threat words in the upper location and the set of 16 threat-neutral word pairs 
with threat words in the lower location were each flowed with 8 upper probes and 8 lower 
probes.
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Table 1. Threat-Neutral Word Pairs Presented in the Word Dot Probe Discrimination Task. 
Threat Words Neutral Words 
dark ball 
gun hill 
dog ago  
murder morocco 
fire town 
cold book 
attacked moonlight 
explosion northwest 
accident explore 
noise farmer 
killed visit 
bomb fare 
kidnapped alphabet 
spider orange 
shark hall 
worried printing 
failed degree  
silly pride 
annoyed essay 
people than 
useless testing 
embarrassed association 
confused partners 
shameful Sheffield 
teacher covered 
rejected memorial 
unpleasant libraries 
foolish drivers 
careless desirable 
school together 
dull hats 
 
Picture Dot Probe Discrimination task. Similar to the word dot probe detection task, the 
picture Dot Probe Discrimination task is also a modified version of the Dot Probe Detection task 
(MacLeod et al., 1986) created for this study. The pictures utilized in this task were three 
drawings of facial expressions depicting the emotion anger (see Table 2). To create the task, four 
faces were created using Microsoft Paint and were rated by a group of 20 individuals aged 7 to 
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36 years. Each face was rated for threat value on a scale of 0 to 3: 0- None, 1- Some, 2- A Little, 
3- A lot. The face with the lowest rating was given a mean rating of .2 and is considered to have 
a neutral rating. In addition, two faces received mean rating of 1.95 and 1.90. These two faces 
differed only on eye size and the face with the lower rating and that more closely resembling the 
neutral (same size eyes as the neutral face) was selected for this task. This face was considered to 
have a mildly-threatening rating. The face with the highest rating was given a mean rating of 2.9  
and was considered to have a highly-threatening rating. During the administration of the picture 
Dot Probe Discrimination task, the mildly-threatening face and the highly-threatening face were 
each paired with a neutral face.  
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Table 2. Faces in Picture Dot Probe Detection Task 
 
Face Rating 
 
Neutral 
 
Mild 
 
High 
 
 
Similar to the word Dot Probe Discrimination task, the picture Dot Probe Discrimination 
task consisted of the presentation of a fixation point, followed by the presentation of a face pair 
(e.g., highly-threatening face paired with a neutral face) The face pair was presented with one 
face above the center of the screen and one face below, both equal distances from the center. The 
participants were asked to read aloud the fixation point, the number ‘1’ or ‘2’. The fixation point 
appeared for 1000msec and was followed by the presentation of a face pair for 500msec. There 
were a total of 48 trails equally divided into three sets: 16 mild threat-neutral face pairs, 16 high 
threat-neutral face pairs and 16 neutral-neutral face pairs. Each mild and high threat-neural face 
pairs was presented with eight threat faces in the top location and 8 threat faces in the bottom 
location. The probes appeared in a similar manner to the word Dot Probe Detection task. In the 
set of mild and high threat-neutral face pairs with threat faces that appear in the top location, 4 of 
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the probes appeared in the bottom location and 4 appeared in the top. Likewise, in the sets of 
mild and high threat face pairs with the threat face in the bottom location, 4 of the probes 
appeared in the bottom location and 4 appeared in the top. Upon the detection of the probe’s 
location, the participants were asked to press the up arrow key if the probe appeared in the top 
location or the down arrow key if the probe appeared in the bottom location. The probe remained 
on the screen until one of the two keys is pressed (with a maximum detection time of 5 seconds). 
The probe detection latency was recorded along with the log of which key was pressed.  
Probe discrimination latencies for both the word Dot Probe Discrimination task and the 
picture Dot Probe Discrimination task were calculated using a formula given by MacLeod and 
Mathews (1988) for the calculation of an Attention Bias score: 
Attention Bias    = (UP/LE - UP/UE) + (LP/UE - LP/LE) 
 2 
For this study, the UP and LP indicate the presence of the probe in the upper and lower 
positions, respectively. Similarly, UE and LE indicate the presence of the threat word in the 
upper and lower positions. Thus, UP/LE designates the mean discrimination latency for trials 
with the probe in the upper position and threat words in the lower positions. The equation 
calculates a mean attention bias score by subtracting the mean scores for probe discrimination in 
the same location from those in the opposing location for both probe locations. Then, the 
differences are added together and the mean is taken to obtain the mean attention bias score. 
Both versions of the Dot Probe Discrimination tasks exhibited good internal consistency (see 
Table 3). 
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Table 3. Internal Consistency for the Word Dot Probe Discrimination Task and the Picture Dot 
Probe Discrimination Task. 
 UP/UE UP/LE LP/UE LP/LE 
 Chronbach’s Alpha Chronbach’s Alpha Chronbach’s Alpha Chronbach’s Alpha 
Word Bias .87 .88 .93 .80 
Picture Bias .88 .88 .88 .86 
Note: Word Bias = Attentional Bias Score for the Word Dot Probe Discrimination Task, Picture 
Bias = Attentional Bias score for the Picture Dot Probe Discrimination Task, UP/UE = Probe in 
upper location, threat word in upper location, UP/LE = Probe in upper location, threat word in 
lower location, LP/UE = Probe in lower location, threat word in upper location, and LP/LE = 
Probe in lower location, threat word in lower location  
 Memory. The word memory task was designed for this study to measure memory bias 
associated with threat related words. The task consisted of 64 words: 16 threat, 16 neutral, 16 
threat-distracter, and 16 neutral-distracter words. The 32 threat and neutral words from each 
group were randomly selected for inclusion from the list utilized in the word Dot Probe 
Discrimination task. A different set 32 threat- and neutral-distracter words were obtained from a 
Dot Probe Detection task for use with adults (Cognition and Emotion Laboratory at the 
University of Western Australia, 2003) and were matched on readability, as measured by Flesch-
Kincaid Grade Level, to the previously used threat and neutral words. The participants were 
handed a form with the list of words presented in random order. The participants were asked to 
indicate which words they remember from the attentional task by checking the box next to the 
word.  
Memory Bias scores were computed using a formula that incorporates both number of 
threat words and number of neutral words recalled and the number of distracter-threat words and 
distracter-neutral words inaccurately reported.  
Memory Bias    = Neutral + 1 Threat + 1 
 Distracter Neutral + 1 
- Distracter Threat + 1 
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 The equation calculates the bias towards threat words by dividing the total number threat 
words recalled by the number of distracter-threat words falsely recalled. That number is then 
subtracted from the number of neutral words recalled divided by the number of distracter-neutral 
words recalled. The number 1 is added to each variable to ensure that neither denominator is 
equal to zero while maintaining the value of the ratios. 
Reading Check. Following the administration of the Memory task, the participants were 
given a list of words identical to the list utilized in the Memory task described above. The list 
given to the participant was unmarked. Each participant was asked to read the words aloud and 
the laboratory assistant marked the words that were read incorrectly on a separate sheet of paper. 
The number of words misread was summed to calculate a Reading score. The Reading score was 
used as a measure of reading ability.  
Interpretation. The Children's Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire was used to 
assess cognitive distortions. (CNCEQ; Leitenberg, Yost, & Carroll-Wilson, 1986). This measure 
is designed to assess four major forms of cognitive distortions (catastrophizing, 
overgeneralization, personalizing, and selective abstraction) through 24 items making up four 
six-item subscales. Each item on the CNCEQ consists of a situation of a possible interpretation 
of an event. The child is asked to respond to each item by indicating how closely the thought 
pattern resembles their thought patterns in that situation (e.g., 1- “not at all like I would think” 5- 
“almost exactly like I would think”). The CNCEQ has been found to have acceptable internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability and construct validity estimates (Leitenberg et al., 1986; 
Thurber, Crow, Thurber, & Woffington, 1990 Weems et al., 2001). Internal consistency 
(coefficient alpha) for the CNCEQ total was computed in this study’s sample. Internal 
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consistencies for the Total CNCEQ score was .89, in the full sample. In youth aged 9 to 12 years 
and youth aged 13 to 17 years internal consistencies for both age groups were .89.  
Procedure 
Informed consent was obtained from the parent and informed assent was obtained from 
the child. The completion of measures took place at the Youth and Family Anxiety, Stress, and 
Phobia Lab on the University of New Orleans campus. Each child completed the measures in a 
separate room from the parent. The assessment took approximately three hours to complete. 
Standard instructions were given to the parent and child separately. During the assessment, the 
child completed a questionnaire battery. Trained research assistants assisted youth in the 
completion of the questionnaires as necessary. Following the completion of the questionnaires, 
the participants were administered the word Dot Probe Discrimination task. Immediately 
following, the participant were asked to complete the Memory task. Upon completion of the 
Memory task, the participants were asked to complete the Reading Check and the picture Dot 
Probe Discrimination task. At the conclusion of the study, all participants were debriefed and 
given a small monetary reward.  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses  
Prior to analysis, demographic data, measures of anxiety, measures of depression, and 
measures of the cognitive mechanisms were examined through the SPSS program for accuracy 
of data entry, missing values, and acceptable score range and skew planned parametric analysis. 
Data were screened for outliers through procedures recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001). Two participants who misread more than 30% of the words on the Reading Check were 
excluded from the following analyses. No other outliers were removed. Missing data was 
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handled through analysis wise deletion. Cases with missing data were not correlated with any of 
the measures used in this study. Means and standard deviations for each of the measures for the 
total sample and by age and gender are presented in Table 4. The frequencies of the Reading 
score indicated that 79% of the sample misread at least one word from the Reading Check. The 
correlations among measures are presented in Table 5. The correlation matrix indicated that the 
Composite Anxiety score and the RCADS High score were significantly correlated with one 
another. All of the subscales of the CNCEQ were correlated with one another and the total 
CNCEQ score.  
Gender, Age, Ethnicity 
Results of 2 (gender) by 2 [age group (9-12 years and 13-17 years)] ANOVAs are 
summarized in Table 4 and indicated that boys and girls did not differ on either measure of 
anxiety nor on any of the measures of cognitive biases. The results indicated a significant 
difference between age groups for the Composite Anxiety scores, RCADS High scores, scores 
on the Catastrophizing subscale of the CNCEQ, and the Reading score. Because the sample sizes 
for the other ethnicities were small, the role of ethnicity was considered separately and only the 
African-American and Caucasian participants were used for the ethnic comparisons. Results of t-
tests indicated that African-American and Caucasian participants significantly differed on 
CNCEQ Catastrophizing [African-American M = 13.08 (SD = 5.2); Caucasian M = 11.01(SD = 
4.0); t(120) = 2.46, p < .05].  
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Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations for Cognitive and Symptom Measures by Age and 
Gender 
 Full Sample 9-12 years 13-17 Years Boys Girls 
Measure M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Compositea .00 (3.13) .92 (3.36) -.86 (2.65) -.19 (3.08) .22 (3.21) 
RCADS 
Higha 64.29 (15.46) 68.01 (15.78) 60.83 (14.46) 63.56 (14.40) 65.11 (16.74) 
Word Bias .80 (41.45) -1.06 (43.11) 2.66 (40.23) -1.86 (42.16) 3.91 (41.01) 
Picture Bias 3.07 (50.10) 1.76 (51.36) 4.28 (49.54) 1.97 (47.01) 4.33 (54.06) 
Memory 
Bias .57 (1.54) .41 (1.54) .73 (1.54) .46 (1.55) .71 (1.52) 
CNCEQ-
Total 48.35 (15.10) 51.48 (15.96) 45.37 (13.76) 47.93 (13.20) 48.81 (17.12) 
CNCEQ-
CTa 12.17 (4.59) 13.53 (5.04) 10.88 (3.74) 12.74 (4.05) 11.54 (5.11) 
CNCEQ-
OG 11.82 (4.63) 11.94 (5.01) 11.71 (4.30) 11.07 (3.56) 12.65 (5.51) 
CNCEQ-PS 12.12 (4.97) 13.05 (5.41) 11.24 (4.40) 11.62 (4.62) 12.68 (5.34) 
CNCEQ-SL 12.23 (3.94) 12.96 (3.92) 11.54 (3.87) 12.50 (3.90) 11.94 (4.01) 
Reading 
Scorea 2.85 (3.80) 4.05 (4.81) 1.74 (2.00) 2.95 (4.01) 2.76 (3.64) 
Note: Superscript a = significant age group difference, Composite = Composite Anxiety Score, 
Word Bias = Attentional Bias Score for the Word Dot Probe Discrimination Task, Picture Bias = 
Attentional Bias score for the Picture Dot Probe Discrimination Task, CNCEQ = Children’s 
Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire, CT = Catastrophizing, OG = Overgeneralizing, PS = 
Personalizing, SA = Selective abstraction.  
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Table 5. Correlations Among Measures of Anxiety, Attentional Bias Scores, Memory Bias 
Scores, and Interpretive Bias Scores.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Composite  .877** .020 .062* .257* .504** .462** .448** .458** .288** 
2. RCADS High   -.045 .224* .242* .511** .489** .399** .477** .320** 
3. Word Bias    -.131* .142* -.037** -.024** -.026** -.015** -.064**
4. Picture Bias     .068* .207** .188** .162** .116** .240** 
5. Memory Bias      -.055** -.094** -.029** -.082** .036** 
6. CNCEQ Total       .850** .815** .870** .786** 
7. CNCEQ-CT        .576** .657** .587** 
8. CNCEQ-OG         .614** .503** 
9. CNCEQ-PS          .584** 
10. CNCEQ-SA           
Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 Two Tailed. Composite = Composite Anxiety Score, Word Bias = 
Attentional Bias Score for the Word Dot Probe Discrimination Task, Picture Bias = Attentional 
Bias score for the Picture Dot Probe Discrimination Task, CNCEQ = Children’s Negative 
Cognitive Error Questionnaire, CT = Catastrophizing, OG = Overgeneralizing, PS = 
Personalizing, SA = Selective abstraction. 
 
Hypotheses 1 
A series of independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine whether there were 
differences between the high and low anxious participants. Results are presented in Table 6. 
Using the Composite Anxiety score, the participants were grouped into 2 groups: high-anxiety 
group (participants with Composite Anxiety scores 1 SD above the mean) and low-anxiety group 
(participants with Composite Anxiety scores 1 SD below the mean). The two groups were 
compared on the mean scores for both the word Dot Probe Discrimination task and the picture 
Dot Probe Discrimination task. The two groups did not differ significantly on either version of 
the Dot Probe Discrimination tasks. Subsequently, using the RCADS High score, the participants 
were grouped into a high-anxious group (participants with RCADS High scores falling 1 SD 
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above the sample mean) and a low-anxious group (participants with RCADS High scores falling 
1 SD below the sample mean). The high- and low-anxious groups did not differ significantly on 
the mean scores for the word Dot Probe Discrimination task. However, the two groups did differ 
significantly on their scores for the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task.   
Table 6. Independent Samples t-Tests for Measures of Selective Attention and Measures Anxiety 
  Word Bias Picture Bias 
  N M SD t df sig. N M SD t df sig. 
Composite  
High 12 2.42 45.06 .18 23 .852 12 2.96 45.16 -.30 23 .770 
 
Low 13 5.99 49.12    13 -1.82 35.28    
RCADS 
High High 13 -14.73 45.92 1.12 20 .277 14 
  
23.57
  
47.77 -2.32 22 .030 
 
Low 9 7.08 43.63    10 -15.51 27.50    
Note: Composite = Composite Anxiety Score, Word Bias = Attentional Bias Score for the Word 
Dot Probe Discrimination Task, Picture Bias = Attentional Bias score for the Picture Dot Probe 
Discrimination Task. 
A series of correlations were calculated and indicated that the Attention Bias scores on 
the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task were significantly correlated with the RCADS High 
scores. However, the Composite Anxiety score was not significantly correlated with the 
Attention Bias score on the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task. Furthermore, the Composite 
Anxiety score was not significantly correlated with Attention Bias scores from either variation of 
the Dot Probe Discrimination task (see Table 5).  
Hypothesis 2 
To test whether Attention Bias scores for the word Dot Probe Discrimination task, 
Attention Bias scores for the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task, Memory Bias scores, total 
CNCEQ scores, and the subscales of the CNCEQ will each be related one another and to 
Composite Anxiety scores or RCADS High scores a series of Pearson correlations were 
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conducted. Results are presented in Table 5. The results indicated that the Attention Bias scores 
for the word Dot Probe Discrimination task were not correlated with any of the other measure of 
cognitive biases or with either measure of anxiety. However, the Attention Bias scores for the 
picture Dot Probe Discrimination task were found to significantly correlate with scores on the 
CNCEQ subscale for Selective Abstraction. Memory Bias scores were not significantly related to 
any of the other measures of cognitive biases. Total CNCEQ scores did not correlate with any 
measure of cognitive biases. However, the results indicated that Composite Anxiety scores were 
significantly and positively correlated with the total CNCEQ scores, each of the scores for the 
CNCEQ subscales, and the memory bias towards threat words. Consequently, as Composite 
Anxiety scores increase, the total CNCEQ scores, the scores on the subscales of the CNCEQ, and 
the Memory Bias scores also increase. Similarly, the results indicated that RCADS High scores 
were significantly and positively correlated with the total CNCEQ scores, each of the scores for 
the CNCEQ subscales, Memory Bias scores, and the Attention Bias scores for the picture Dot 
Probe Discrimination task. Thus, as RCADS High scores increase, the scores for the total 
CNCEQ, the scores on the subscales of the CNCEQ, the Memory Bias, and the Attention Bias 
score for the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task also increase. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 was that memory biases towards the recall of threatening information 
would mediate the relation between selective attention and interpretive bias. However, results 
indicated that Attention Bias scores from the word Dot Probe Discrimination task did not 
significantly predict Memory Bias scores (β = -.142, not significant). Because the first condition 
for mediation was not met, the subsequent analyses for mediation were not conducted. Results 
using the Attention Bias scores from the picture Dot Probe Detection task as a predictor of 
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Memory Bias scores indicated that Attention Bias scores did not significantly predict Memory 
Bias scores (β = -.068, not significant). Likewise, due to a failure to meet the first condition of 
mediation, the subsequent analyses for mediation were not conducted. 
Hypothesis 4 
Due to the insufficient evidence to support the mediation of the relation between 
selective attention and interpretive biases by memory biases, a series of hierarchical linear 
regressions were conducted to test whether the three cognitive biases were predictive of anxiety 
problems in children. The results are presented in Table 7. The first analysis used the Composite 
Anxiety score as the criterion variable, age and gender were entered into the first step, Attention 
Bias scores from the word Dot Probe Discrimination task and Memory Bias scores were entered 
into the second step, and the total CNCEQ scores were entered into the third step. The results 
indicated that Attention Bias scores from the word Dot Probe Discrimination task and Memory 
Bias scores were not significantly predictive of Composite Anxiety scores. Similar results were 
found when using age and gender in the first step, Attention Bias scores from the picture Dot 
Probe Discrimination task and Memory Bias scores in the second step, total CNCEQ scores in 
the third step, and Composite Anxiety scores as the criterion variable. For the third analysis, age 
and gender were entered into the first step, Attention Bias scores from the word Dot Probe 
Discrimination task and Memory Bias scores were entered into the second step, total CNCEQ 
scores were entered into the third step, and RCADS High scores were entered as the criterion 
variable. The results of the third analysis indicated that the Attention Bias scores from the word 
Dot Probe Discrimination task and Memory Bias scores were not predictive of RCADS High 
scores. 
 36
Table 7. Summary of Regression Analyses Predicting Composite Anxiety Scores and RCADS 
High Scores  
Step Measure R2 Change in R2 t p β VIF 
Predicting Composite Anxiety Scores  
1 Age .07 .07 -2.2 .030 -.26 1.1 
 Gender   -1.2 .252 -.14 1.1 
2 Word Bias .14 .07   0.3 .799   .03 1.0 
 Memory Bias     2.4 .022   .27 1.0 
3 CNCEQ .33 .19   4.5 .000   .45 1.0 
        
1 Age .07 .07 -2.1 .038 -.25 1.0 
 Gender   -1.3 .204 -.15 1.0 
2 Picture Bias .08 .01   0.7 .487   .08 1.0 
 Memory Bias     0.0 .972   .00 1.0 
3 CNCEQ .26 .18   4.0 .000   .44 1.0 
        
Predicting RCADS High Scores 
1 Age .04 .04 -1.7 .091 -.20 1.1 
 Gender   -0.6 .549 -.07 1.1 
2 Word Bias .10 .06 -0.3 .748 -.04 1.0 
 Memory Bias     2.1 .038  .24 1.0 
3 CNCEQ .32 .22   4.7 .000  .48 1.0 
        
1 Age .04 .04 -1.7 .094 -.20 1.0 
 Gender   -1.0 .315 -.12 1.0 
2 Picture Bias .18 .14   2.4 .017   .27 1.0 
 Memory Bias     2.6 .013   .28 1.0 
3 CNCEQ .36 .18   4.4 .000   .44 1.0 
Note: Word Bias = Attentional Bias Score for the Word Dot Probe Discrimination Task, Picture 
Bias = Attentional Bias score for the Picture Dot Probe Discrimination Task, CNCEQ = 
Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire. 
 
In the final analysis, RCADS High scores used as the criterion variable, age and gender 
were entered into the first step, Attention Bias scores from the picture Dot Probe Discrimination 
task and Memory Bias scores were entered in the second step, and the total CNCEQ scores were 
entered in the third step. The results indicated that Attention Bias scores from the picture Dot 
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Probe Discrimination task and Memory Bias scores were predictive of RCADS High scores 
when controlling for both age and gender. Attention Bias scores from the picture Dot Probe 
Discrimination task and Memory Bias scores accounted for an additional of 14% of the variance 
in RCADS High scores. Moreover, the total CNCEQ score was a significant predictor, 
accounting for an additional 18% of the variance in the RCADS High scores beyond age, gender, 
Attention Bias scores from the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task, and Memory Bias scoresi. 
Discussion 
This investigation added to the literature by examining the linkages among three 
cognitive biases and childhood anxiety problems. In general the results indicate that there were 
links between selective attention and childhood anxiety problems. The results indicated that there 
was a link between childhood anxiety problems and Attention Bias scores on the picture Dot 
Probe Discrimination task. The findings were consistent with previous research that has shown a 
link between selective attention and childhood anxiety problems (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2003; 
Vasey et al., 1995; Vasey et al. 1996). Specifically, the results indicated highly anxious children 
(participants with scores falling 1 SD above the sample mean) have a significantly greater bias 
towards attending to threat pictures as compared to low anxious children (participants with 
scores falling 1 SD above the sample mean). Moreover, the results indicated that there was a 
significant correlation between RCADS High scores and Attention Bias scores on the picture Dot 
Probe Discrimination task. Taken together, the results suggest that selective attention towards 
threat related information may be displayed not only in high and low anxious children but also 
across a community sample. 
                                                 
i Ethnicity was not found to moderate the relations between RCADS High scores and Attention Bias scores from the 
picture Dot Probe Discrimination task or the relations between RCADS High scores and Memory Bias scores.  
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In addition, the results of this study indicate that selective attention, memory bias, and 
interpretive bias work together to predict childhood anxiety problems. These results support a 
cognitive model of anxiety which suggests that various cognitive biases (e.g., selective 
abstraction, memory bias, and interpretive bias) may work in concert to predict childhood 
anxiety problems. Results also lend support to the supposition that interpretive bias may be more 
proximally related to anxiety problems in youth than are selective attention and memory bias 
(Weems & Watts, 2005). Such results point to the potential importance of these three biases in 
understanding childhood anxiety problems. Given the results of the study, possible 
improvements could be made to the model proposed by Weems and Watts (2005) by taking into 
account the manner in which the three biases are related to anxiety. For instance, the model 
might include a possible mediational role of interpretive bias in the relation between memory 
bias and childhood anxiety problems. Further research is needed to explore the possible 
mediational role that interpretive biases may play in the prediction of childhood anxiety 
problems by other cognitive biases.  
Moreover, the results of this study extend the literature by exploring the relations 
between selective attention, memory bias, and interpretive bias. The results lend partial support 
for the model proposed by Weems and Watts (2005) that selective attention, memory bias, and 
interpretive bias are linked to one another. The results indicate that there is only a small but 
significant correlation between interpretive bias and selective attention. In particular, selective 
abstraction was the interpretive bias linked to selective attention. This finding is consistent with 
the definition of the two constructs. Specifically, selective attention and selective abstraction 
involve focusing on the negative or threatening aspects of an event. Thus, by definition the two 
constructs should be closely linked. The remaining links between the three biases did not yield 
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significant correlations. These results are consistent with results found by Dalgleish et al. (2003), 
which failed to support a link between selective attention and memory bias. Therefore, the results 
do not support the mediation of the relation between selective attention and interpretive bias by 
memory bias.  
The results did not indicate a link between Composite Anxiety scores and the Attention 
Bias scores on the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task. The results were inconsistent with the 
findings of the present studies comparison of RCADS High scores and the Attention Bias scores 
on the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task discussed above. The discrepancy in the findings 
between the two anxiety scores and the results of the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task may 
be due to the nature of the two measures used to compute the two scores. The RCMAS assesses 
general levels of trait anxiety in children (Reynolds & Richmond, 1978) and the RCADS is used 
to assess DSM-IV symptoms of childhood anxiety disorders (Chorpita et al., 2000 and Spence, 
1997). The majority of the research examining the relations between childhood anxiety problems 
and selective attention has focused children with clinical diagnoses of an anxiety disorders (see 
Vasey et al., 1996). The inconsistent results between the two measures of anxiety may be 
reflective of differences in the way selective attention is associated with different types of 
childhood anxiety problems. Specifically, selective attention may be more closely liked with 
symptom levels of specific anxiety disorders than with general levels of trait anxiety in children.   
The results of the analyses utilizing the word Dot Probe Discrimination task were 
inconsistent with the findings of previous research that found a connection between childhood 
anxiety problems and Attention Bias scores on the word Dot Probe Detection tasks (e.g., Vasey 
et al., 1996 and Neshat-Doost et al., 2000). The failure to find a link between the selective 
attention and childhood anxiety problems using the Attention Bias scores on the word Dot Probe 
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Discrimination task may be reflective of the developmental requirements needed for the word 
Dot Probe Discrimination task. Specifically, the reading ability required to perform the word Dot 
Probe Discrimination task. In order for the word Dot Probe Discrimination task to be a valid 
measure of selective attention, the child should be able to read and correctly interpret the 
meaning of the words used in the task in a relatively short period of time (i.e., 1,500ms per word 
pair). Although, the words used for the task had been used in previous research for children ages 
9 to 17 years (see Neshat-Doost et al., 2000), the results of the Reading Check indicated that only 
23.5% of the participants were able to read all the words in the task correctly. These results 
might indicate the word Dot Probe Discrimination task may not be sensitive to the development 
of reading skills in children.  
In addition, cultural differences may have had an effect on the emotional valence of the 
words utilized in this study. The threat and neutral words were generated by a group of 221 
children in 6 primary and secondary schools in London (Neshat-Doost, et al., 1999). The results 
of this study may have been confounded by the effects cultural differences may have on the 
emotional valence words utilized in this study. Specifically, differences between the two samples 
on the emotional valence of the words may have made the word Dot Probe Discrimination task 
less sensitive in detecting biases towards emotional words. The use of word pairs developed by a 
sample of children with more similar cultural backgrounds may allow for the word Dot Probe 
Discrimination task to more accurately the presence or absence of biases towards threat words. 
Similarly, the discrepancy in the findings may be due to the use of a word Dot Probe 
Discrimination task instead of a word Dot Probe Detection task. As discussed above, a 
Discrimination task has fewer trials and each trial is followed by a probe. In contrast, the 
Detection task has more trials and only a certain number of trials are probed (e.g., Neshat-Doost, 
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et al., 2000). The use of fewer trials may make the word Detection task more sensitive to the 
effects of differences in reading ability.  
Previous literature has compared two types of measures, a modified version of the Stroop 
Color-Naming task and a modified version of the dot probe detection task, and has found almost 
no correlation between the two measures (Dalgleish, 1995). Dalgleish (1995) suggested that the 
reason for the discrepancy was that the methodology of the two tasks tapped into different 
constructs involved in the attentional process. The current study adds to the literature by 
supplying an estimate of the convergent validity between two variants of the Dot Probe 
Discrimination task that differed on only the type of type of stimuli used (words and pictures) 
and the presentation time of the stimuli (1,500ms and 500ms, respectively). Similar to the 
findings of Dalgleish (1995) when comparing the Dot Probe Detection task and a modified 
version of the Stroop Color-Naming task, there was almost no correlation between the Attention 
Bias scores for the word Dot Probe Discrimination task and the picture Dot Probe Discrimination 
task.  
The lack of convergent validity between the two variants of the Dot Probe Discrimination 
tasks may be reflective of the different developmental constraints required of the participant to 
perform each task. Therefore, the word Dot Probe Discrimination task may be confounded by the 
reading ability of the children; whereas, the picture Dot Probe Discrimination task does not 
necessitate any specific level of reading ability. This would suggest that the picture Dot Probe 
Discrimination task might be a more effective measure in assessing selective attention in 
younger age groups.  
Although this study contributes to the existing literature on the relation between cognitive 
biases and childhood anxiety problems, the study does have limitations. First, the study is limited 
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by its cross-sectional design. Because the study does not inform us regarding whether cognitive 
biases are predictive or just associated with anxiety problems in children, further research is 
needed to explore whether cognitive biases precede the development of anxiety problems in 
children. In addition, the study is limited by its reliance on self-report measures. Specifically, the 
associations between RCADS high scores and CNCEQ scores may appear stronger than the 
associations between RCADS high scores and the Attention Bias scores from the picture Dot 
Probe Discrimination task due to the method variance between the measures. Moreover, our 
recruitment strategy may limit the generalizability of the study’s findings and thus replication in 
additional samples of youth is also needed. In addition, future research would benefit from the 
exploration of the role of judgment bias, which involve negative and or lowered estimates of the 
individual’s coping ability or style, in childhood anxiety problems and its relation to the other 
cognitive biases examined in this study.  
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